We present a constant-round unconditional black-box compiler that transforms any ideal (i.e., statistically-hiding and statistically-binding) straight-line extractable commitment scheme, into an extractable and equivocal commitment scheme, therefore yielding to UC-security [Can01]. We exemplify the usefulness of our compiler by providing two (constant-round) instantiations of ideal straight-line extractable commitment based on (malicious) PUFs [OSVW13] and stateless tamper-proof hardware tokens [Kat07], therefore achieving the first unconditionally UC-secure commitment with malicious PUFs and stateless tokens, respectively. Our constructions are secure for adversaries creating arbitrarily malicious stateful PUFs/tokens.
Introduction
Unconditional security guarantees that a protocol is secure even when the adversary is unbounded. While it is known how to achieve unconditional security for multi-party functionalities in the plain model assuming honest majority [BGW88, CCD88] , obtaining unconditionally secure two-party computation is impossible in the plain model. In fact, for all non-trivial two-party functionalities, achieving unconditional security requires some sort of (physical) setup assumption.
Universally composable (UC) security [Can01] guarantees that a protocol is secure even when executed concurrently with many other instances of any arbitrary protocol. This strong notion captures the real world scenarios, where typically many applications are run concurrently over the internet, and is therefore very desirable to achieve. Unfortunately, achieving UC-security in the plain model is impossible [CKL03] .
Hence, to have a 2-party protocol whose security either withstands any unbounded adversary (unconditional security), or holds in presence of concurrent executions with arbitrary protocols (UC-security) -or both, if one aims for the best -one must trust in some setup. One natural research direction is to explore which setup assumptions suffice to achieve (unconditional) UC, as well as to determine whether (or to what extent) we can reduce the amount of trust in some third party. Furthermore, exploring multiple setup assumptions allows for more options when designing a protocol. Hence, several setup assumptions have been explored by the community. In the following, we briefly go over some assumptions proposed in literature to achieve unconditional and/or UCsecurity, and motivate our focus to the stateless token and (malicious) PUF model.
In [CLOS02] Canetti et. al show that any functionality can be UC-realized assuming the existence of a trusted Common Reference String (CRS), under computational assumptions. Here, the security crucially relies on the CRS being honestly sampled. Hence, security in practice would typically rely on a third party sampling the CRS honestly and security breaks down if the third party is not honest. Similar arguments apply to various assumptions like "public-key registration" services [BCNP04, CDPW07] .
Another line of research explores "physical" setup assumptions. Based on various types of noisy channels, unconditionally secure Bit Commitment (BC) and Oblivious Transfer (OT) can be achieved [CK88, DKS99] for two parties, but UC security has not been shown for these protocols and in fact seems non-trivial to get for the case of [DKS99] .
In [Kat07] Katz introduces the assumption of the existence of tamper-proof hardware tokens. The assumption is supported by the possibility of implementing tamper-proof hardware using current available technology (e.g., smart cards). A token is defined as a physical device (a wrapper), on which a player can upload the code of any functionality, and the assumption is that any adversary cannot tamper with the token. Namely, the adversary has only black-box access to the token, i.e., it cannot do more then observing the input/output characteristic of the token. The main motivation behind this new setup assumption is that it allows for a reduction of trust. Indeed in Katz's model tokens are not assumed to be trusted ( i.e., produced by a trusted party) and the adversary is allowed to create a token that implements an arbitrary malicious function instead of the function dictated by the protocol. (However, it is assumed that once the token is sent away to the honest party, it cannot communicate with its creator. This assumption is necessary, as otherwise we are back to the plain model). A consequence of this model is that the security of a player now depends only on its own token being good and holds even if tokens used by other players are not genuine! This new setup assumptions has gained a lot of interest and several work after [Kat07] have shown that unconditional UC-security is possible [MS08, GIS + 10], even using a single stateful token [DKMQ11, DKMQ12] . Note that a stateful token, in contrast with a stateless token, requires an updatable memory that can be subject to reset attacks. Thus, ensuring tamper-proofness for a stateful token seems to be more demanding than for a stateless token, and hence having protocols working with stateless tokens is preferable.
However, the only constructions known for stateless tokens require computational assumptions [CGS08, Kol10, GIS + 10, CKS + 11] and a non-constant number of rounds (if based on oneway functions only). In fact, intuitively it seems challenging to achieve unconditional security with stateless tokens: A stateless token runs always on the same state, thus an unbounded adversary might be able to extract the secret state after having observed only a polynomial number of the token's outputs. This intuition is confirmed by [GIMS10] where it is proved that unconditional OT is impossible using stateless tokens. On the positive side, [GIMS10] shows an unconditional commitment scheme (not UC) based on stateless tokens, but the security of the scheme holds only if the adversary is not allowed to create malicious stateful tokens. This is in contrast with the standard tamper-proof hardware model, where the adversary is allowed to construct any arbitrary malicious (hence possibly stateful) token. Indeed, it seems difficult in practice to detect whether an adversary sends you a stateless or a stateful token. Therefore, the question of achieving unconditional commitments (UC-secure or not) in the standard stateless token model (where an adversary possibly plays with stateful tokens) is still open.
In this work we provide a positive answer showing the first UC-secure unconditional commitment scheme with stateless tokens.
Following the approach of [Kat07], Brzuska et al. in [BFSK11a] propose a new setup assumption for achieving UC security, which is the existence of Physically Uncloneable Functions (PUFs). PUFs have been introduced by Pappu in [Pap01, PRTG02] , and since then have gained a lot of interest for cryptographic applications [GKST07, GvDC + 08, AMS + 09, RSS09, FBA09, SVW10, AMS + 11, Rüh10, MHV12]. A PUF is a physical noisy source of randomness. In other words a PUF is a device implementing a function whose behavior is unpredictable even to the manufacturer. The reason is that even knowing the exact manufacturing process there are parameters that cannot be controlled, therefore it is assumed infeasible to construct two PUFs with the same challenge-response behavior. A PUF is noisy in the sense that, when queried twice with the same challenge, it can output two different, although close, responses. Fuzzy extractors are applied to PUF's responses in order to reproduce a unique response for the same challenge. The "PUF assumption" consists in assuming that PUFs satisfy two properties: 1) unpredictability: the distribution implemented by a PUF is unpredictable. That is, even after a polynomial number of challenge/response pairs have been observed, where the challenges can be adaptively chosen, the response on any new challenge (sufficiently far from the ones observed so far) is unpredictable; this property is unconditional; 2) uncloneability: as a PUF is the output of a physical uncontrollable manufacturing process, it is assumed that creating two identical PUFs is hard even for the manufacturer. This property is called hardware uncloneability. Software uncloneability corresponds to the hardness of modeling the function implemented by the PUF and is enforced by unpredictability (given that the challenge/response space of the PUF is adequately large). Determining whether (or to what extent) current PUF candidates actually satisfy the PUF assumption is an active area of research (e.g., [KKR + 12, BHNS13] ) but is out of the scope of this work. For a survey on PUF's candidates the reader can refer to [MV10] , while a security analysis of silicon PUFs is provided in [KKR + 12] .
Designing PUF-based protocols is fundamentally different than for other hardware tokens. This is due to the fact that the functional behavior of a PUF is unpredictable even for its creator. This causes an asymmetric situation in which only the party in possession of the PUF has full access to the secrets [BFSK11b] . Brzuska et al. modeled PUFs in the UC-setting by formalizing the ideal PUF functionality. They then provided constructions for Unconditional UC-OT and UC-BC. Somewhat surprisingly, it turns out that unconditional UC-OT is possible with (honest) PUFs, while it is impossible with (honest) stateless tokens [GIMS10] . However, the UC-definition of PUFs proposed in [BFSK11a] assumes that all PUFs are trusted. Namely, they assume that even a malicious player creates PUFs honestly, following the prescribed generation procedure. This assumption seems too optimistic as it implies that an adversary must not be capable of constructing hardware that "looks like" a PUF but that instead computes some arbitrary function. The consequence of assuming that all PUFs are trusted is that the security of a player depends on the PUFs created by other players. (Indeed, in the OT protocol of [BFSK11a] , if the receiver replaces the PUF with hardware implementing some predictable function, the security of the sender is broken).
In [OSVW13] Ostrovsky et al. extend the ideal PUF functionality of [BFSK11a] in order to model the adversarial behavior of creating and using "malicious PUFs" in the UC framework. A malicious PUF is a physical device for which the security properties of a PUF are not guaranteed. As such, it can be a device implementing any function chosen by the adversary, so that the adversary might have full control on the answers computed by its own "PUF". Similarly to the hardware-token model, a malicious PUF cannot communicate with the creator once is sent away. A malicious PUF can, of course, be stateful. The major advantage of the malicious PUF model is that the security of a player depends only on the goodness of its own PUFs. Obviously, the price to pay is that protocols secure in presence of malicious PUFs are more complex that protocols designed to deal only with honest PUFs. Nevertheless, [OSVW13] shows that even with malicious PUFs it is possible to achieve UC-secure computations relying on computational assumptions and an unconditional commitment scheme which is secure only in the indistinguishability sense. Achieving unconditional UC-secure commitments (and general secure computations) is left as an open problem in [OSVW13] .
In this paper, we provide a (partial) positive answer to this open problem by providing the first construction of unconditional UC-secure Bit Commitment in the malicious PUFs model. Whether unconditional OT (and thus general secure computation) is possible with malicious PUFs is still an interesting open question. Intuitively, since PUFs are stateless devices, one would think to apply the arguments used for the impossibility of unconditional OT with stateless tokens [GIMS10]. However, due to the unpredictability property of PUFs which holds unconditionally, such arguments do not carry through. Indeed, as long as there is at least one honest PUF in the system, there is enough entropy, and this seems to defeat the arguments used in [GIMS10] . On the other hand, since a PUF is in spirit just a "random function", it is not clear how to implement the OT functionality when only one of the players uses honest PUFs.
Van Dijk and Rührmair in [vDR12] also consider adversaries who create malicious PUFs, that they call "bad PUFs" and they consider only the stand-alone setting. They show that unconditional OT is impossible in the bad PUF model but this impossibility proof works assuming that also honest parties play with bad PUFs. Thus such impossibility proof has no connection to the question of achieving unconditional OT in the malicious PUF model (where honest parties play with honest PUFs).
Our Contribution. In this work we provide a tool for constructing UC-secure commitments given any straight-line extractable commitment. This essentially means that the task of constructing UCsecure commitment is reduced to the perhaps simpler task of achieving extractable commitments. This tool allows us to show feasibility results for unconditional UC-secure protocols in the stateless token model and in the malicious PUF model. More precisely, we provide a compiler that transforms any ideal extractable commitment into a UC-secure commitment. An ideal extractable commitment is a statistically hiding, statistically binding and straight-line extractable commitment. The transformation uses the ideal extractable commitment as black-box and is unconditional, that is, it does not require any further assumption. The key advantage of such compiler is that one can implement the ideal extractable commitment with the setup assumption that is more suitable to the application and the technology available.
We then provide an implementation of the ideal extractable commitment scheme in the malicious PUFs model of [OSVW13] . Our construction builds upon the (stand-alone) unconditional BC scheme shown in [OSVW13] 1 which is not extractable. By plugging our extractable commitment scheme in our compiler we obtain the first unconditional UC-secure commitment with malicious PUFs.
We then construct ideal extractable commitments using stateless tokens. We use some of the ideas employed for the PUF construction, but implement them with different techniques. Indeed, while PUFs are intrinsically unpredictable and even having oracle access to a PUF an unbounded adversary cannot predict the function run by it, with stateless tokens we do not have such guarantee and uncontrolled access to a token might reveal the function embedded in it. Our protocol is secure in the standard stateless token model, where the adversary has no restriction and can send malicious stateful tokens. By plugging such protocol in our compiler, we achieve the first unconditional UCsecure commitment scheme with stateless tokens. Given that unconditional OT is impossible with stateless tokens, this result completes the picture concerning feasibility of unconditional UC-security with stateless tokens.
Remark. In the rest of the paper it is assumed that even an unbounded adversary can query the PUF/token only a polynomial number of times. We stress that this is not a restriction of our work but it is a necessary assumption in all previous works achieving unconditional security with PUFs and stateless tokens. (See Pag.15 of [BFSK11b] for PUFs, and Pag. 5 of [GIMS10] for stateless tokens). Indeed, if we allowed the adversary to query the PUF/token on all possible challenges, then she can derive the truth table implemented by the physical device.
Definitions
Notation. We denote by n the security parameter and by PPT the property of a probabilistic algorithm whose number of steps is polynomial in its security parameter. We denote by (v A , v B ) ← A(a), B(b) (x) the local outputs of A and B of the random process obtained by having A and B activated with independent random tapes, interacting on common input x and on (private) auxiliary inputs a to A and b to B. When the common input x is the security parameter, we omit it. If A is a probabilistic algorithm we use v $ ← A(x) to denote the output of A on input x assigned to v. We denote by view A (A(a), B(b))(x) the view of A of the interaction with player B, i.e., its values is the transcript (γ 1 , γ 2 , ..., γ t ; r), where the γ i 's are all the messages exchanged and r is A's coin tosses. We use notation [n] to denote the set {1, . . . , n}. Let P 1 and P 2 be two parties running protocol (A,B) as sub-routine. When we say that party "P 1 runs A(·), B(·) (·) with P 2 " we always mean that P 1 executes the procedure of party A and P 2 executes the procedure of party B. In the following definitions we assume that the adversary has auxiliary information, and assume that parties are stateful.
Ideal Extractable Commitment Scheme
We denote by F aux an auxiliary set-up functionality accessed by the real world parties (and the extractor).
Definition 1 (Ideal Commitment Scheme in the F aux model). A commitment scheme is a tuple of PPT algorithms Com = (C, R) having access to an ideal set-up functionality F aux , implementing the following two-phase functionality. Given to C an input b ∈ {0, 1}, in the first phase called commitment phase, C interacts with R to commit to the bit b. We denote this interaction by ((c, d) , c) ← C(com, b), R(recv) where c is the transcript of the (possibly interactive) commitment phase and d is the decommitment data. In the second phase, called decommitment phase, C sends (b, d) and R finally outputs "accept" or "reject" according to (c, d, b) . In both phases parties could access to F aux . Com = (C, R) is an ideal commitment scheme if it satisfies the following properties.
Completeness. For any b ∈ {0, 1}, if C and R follow their prescribed strategy then R accepts the commitment c and the decommitment (b, d) with probability 1.
Statistically Hiding. For any malicious receiver R * the ensembles {view R * (C(com, 0), R * ) (1 n )} n∈N and {view R * (C(com, 1), R * ) (1 n )} n∈N are statistically indistinguishable, where view R * (C(com, b), R * ) denotes the view of R * restricted to the commitment phase.
Statistically Binding. For any malicious committer C * , there exists a negligible function , such that C * succeeds in the following game with probability at most (n): On security parameter 1 n , C * interacts with R in the commitment phase obtaining the transcript c . Then C * outputs pairs (0, d 0 ) and (1, d 1 ), and succeeds if in the decommitment phase,
In this paper the term ideal is used to refer to a commitment which is statistically-hiding and statistically-binding.
Definition 2 (Interface Access to an Ideal Functionality F aux ). Let Π = (P 1 , P 2 ) be a two-party protocol in the F aux -hybrid model. That is, parties P 1 and P 2 need to query the ideal functionality F aux in order to carry out the protocol. An algorithm M has interface access to the ideal functionality F aux w.r.t. protocol Π if all queries made by either party P 1 or P 2 to F aux during the protocol execution are observed (but not answered) by M , and M has oracle access to F aux . Namely, F aux can be a non programmable and non PPT functionality.
is an ideal extractable commitment scheme in the F aux model if (C ext , R ext ) is an ideal commitment and there exists a straight-line strict polynomial-time extractor E having interface access to F aux , that runs the commitment phase only and outputs a value b ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} such that, for all malicious committers C * , the following properties are satisfied.
Simulation: the view generated by the interaction between E and C * is identical to the view generated when C * interacts with the honest receiver R ext : view
Extraction: let c be a valid transcript of the commitment phase run between C * and E. If E outputs ⊥ then probability that C * will provide an accepting decommitment is negligible.
Binding: if b = ⊥, then probability that C * decommits to a bit b = b is negligible.
Physically Uncloneable Functions
Here we recall the definition of PUFs taken from [BFSK11a] . A Physically Uncloneable Function (PUF) is a noisy physical source of randomness. A PUF is evaluated with a physical stimulus, called the challenge, and its physical output, called the response, is measured. Because the processes involved are physical, the function implemented by a PUF can not necessarily be modeled as a mathematical function, neither can be considered computable in PPT. Moreover, the output of a PUF is noisy, namely, querying a PUF twice with the same challenge, could yield to different outputs.
A PUF-family P is a pair of (not necessarily efficient) algorithms Sample and Eval. Algorithm Sample abstracts the PUF fabrication process and works as follows. Given the security parameter in input, it outputs a PUF-index id from the PUF-family satisfying the security property (that we define soon) according to the security parameter. Algorithm Eval abstracts the PUF-evaluation process. On input a challenge s, it evaluates the PUF on s and outputs the response σ. A PUFfamily is parametrized by two parameters: the bound on the noisy of the answers d noise , and the size of the range rg. A PUF is assumed to satisfy the bounded noise condition, that is, when running Eval(1 n , id, s) twice, the Hamming distance of any two responses σ 1 , σ 2 is smaller than d noise (n). We assume that the challenge space of a PUF is the set of strings of a certain length. Security Properties. We assume that PUFs enjoy the properties of uncloneability and unpredictability. Unpredictability is modeled in [BFSK11a] via an entropy condition on the PUF distribution. Namely, given that a PUF has been measured on a polynomial number of challenges, the response of the PUF evaluated on a new challenge has still a significant amount of entropy. The following definition automatically implies uncloneability (see [BFSK11b] pag. 39 for details).
Definition 4 (Unpredictability). A (rg, d noise )-PUF family P = (Sample, Eval) for security parameter n is (d min (n), m(n))-unpredictable if for any s ∈ {0, 1} n and challenge list Q = (s 1 , . . . , s poly(n) ), one has that, if for all 1 ≤ k ≤ poly(n) the Hamming distance satisfies dis ham (s, s k ) ≥ d min (n), then the average min-entropy satisfiesH ∞ (PUF(s)|PUF(Q)) ≥ m(n), where PUF(Q) denotes a sequence of random variables PUF(s 1 ), . . . , PUF(s poly(n) ) each corresponding to an evaluation of the PUF on challenge s k . Such a PUF-family is called a (rg, d noise , d min , m)-PUF family.
Fuzzy Extractors
The output of a PUF is noisy. That is, querying the PUF twice with the same challenge, one might obtain two distinct responses σ, σ , that are at most d noise apart in hamming distance. Fuzzy extractors of Dodis et al. [DORS08] are applied to the outputs of the PUF, to convert such noisy, high-entropy measurements into reproducible randomness. Very roughly, a fuzzy extractor is a pair of efficient randomized algorithms (FuzGen, FuzRep), and it is applied to PUFs 'responses as follows. FuzGen takes as input an -bit string, that is the PUF's response σ, and outputs a pair (p, st), where st is a uniformly distributed string, and p is a public helper data string. FuzRep takes as input the PUF's noisy response σ and the helper data p and generates the very same string st obtained with the original measurement σ.
The security property of fuzzy extractors guarantees that, if the min-entropy of the PUF's responses are greater than a certain parameter m, knowledge of the public data p only, without the measurement σ, does not give any information on the secret value st. The correctness property, guarantees that, all pairs of responses σ, σ that are close enough, i.e., their hamming distance is less then a certain parameter t, will be recovered by FuzRep to the same value st generated by FuzGen. In order to apply fuzzy extractors to PUF's responses it is sufficient to pick an extractor whose parameters match with the parameter of the PUF being used. For formal definitions of fuzzy extractors and PUFs the reader is referred to App. A.1.
Ideal Functionalities for Malicious PUFs and Stateless Tokens. We follow the malicious PUF model introduced in [OSVW13] . In this model, the adversary is allowed to create arbitrarily malicious PUFs. Very informally, a malicious PUF is any physical device that "look like" a PUF but it implements an arbitrary malicious, possibly stateful, function. Such adversarial behaviour has been modeled in [OSVW13] by extending the ideal functionality proposed in [BFSK11a] . We denote by F PUF the ideal functionality for malicious PUF, and we provide its formal description in App. A.3. Stateless Tokens are modeled through the ideal functionality F wrap [Kat07, CGS08] described in App. A.4. Definition of UC-security are provided in App. 10.
The Compiler
In this section we show how to transform any ideal extractable commitment scheme into a protocol that UC-realizes the F com functionality, unconditionally. Such transformation is based on the following building blocks.
Extractable Blobs. "Blob" was used in [BCC88] to denote a commitment. In this paper a blob is a pair of bit commitments such that the actual bit committed in the blob is the xor of the pair. As we shall see soon, the representation of a bit as its exclusive-or allows to prove equality of the bits committed in two blobs without revealing the values and more importantly using commitments as black boxes. Let IdealExtCom be any ideal extractable commitment scheme satisfying Def. 3. If the commitment phase of IdealExtCom is interactive then the blob is the pair of transcripts obtained from the interaction. Procedures to create a blob of a bit b, and to reveal the bit committed in the blob, are the following. Clearly, a blob inherits the properties of the commitment scheme used as sub-protocol. In particular, in the above case, since IdealExtCom is used as sub-routine, each blob is statistically hiding/binding, and straight-line extractable.
Equality of Blobs. Given the representation of a bit commitment as a blob, a protocol due to Kilian [Kil92] allows to prove that two committed bits (two blobs) are equal, without revealing their values. We build upon this protocol to construct a "simulatable" version, meaning that (given some trapdoor) a simulator can prove equality of two blobs that are not equal. Let B i , B j be two blobs.
be the bit committed in B j . Let P denote the prover and V the verifier. In the following protocol P proves to V that B i and B j are the commitment of the same bit (i.e., b i = b j ). ProveBlobsEquality(B i , B j ) 1. V uniformly chooses e ∈ {0, 1} and commits to e using IdealExtCom.
V reveals e to P . 4. P reveals b e i and b e j (i.e., P sends decommitments d e i , d e j to V ). V accepts iff y = b e i ⊕ b e j . Protocol ProveBlobsEquality satisfies the following properties. Soundness: if b i = b j , any malicious prover P * convinces V with probability 1/2, that is the probability of guessing the challenge e. Here we are using the statistically hiding property of the ideal commitment IdealExtCom used to commit e. Privacy: If b i = b j then after executing the protocol, the view of any verifier V * , is independent of the actual value of b i , b j (given that B i , B j were secure at the beginning of the protocol). Simulation: there exists a straight-line strictly PPT simulator SimFalse such that, for any (B i , B j ) that are not equal, i.e., b i = b j , for any malicious verifier V * , produces a view that is statistically close to the case in which (B i , B j ) are equal, i.e., b i = b j and V * interacts with the honest P . The above properties are formally proved in Appendix B.
Note that the protocol uses blobs in a black-box way. Note also, that a blob can be involved in a single proof only.
Unconditional UC-secure Commitments from Ideal Extractable Commitments
We construct unconditional UC-secure commitments using extractable blobs and protocol ProveBlobsEquality as building blocks. We want to implement the following idea. The committer sends two blobs of the same bit and proves that they are equal running protocol ProveBlobsEquality. In the decommitment phase, it opens only one blob (a similar technique is used in [Hof11] , where instead the commitment scheme is crucially used in a non black-box way). The simulator would extract the bit of the committer by exploiting the extractability property of blobs. The simulator can equivocate by committing to the pair 0 and 1, and cheating in the protocol ProveBlobsEquality, by running the simulator associated to it. In the opening phase, it then opens the blob corresponding to the right bit. This idea does not work straight-forwardly since soundness of protocol ProveBlobsEquality holds only with probability 1/2 and thus a malicious committer can break binding with the same probability. We cannot amplify the soundness by running many proofs on the same pair of blobs, since a blob can be involved in a proof only once. (This is due to the fact that we treat blobs in a black-box manner). Running many proofs among many independent pairs of blobs, and ask the committer to open half of them, is the way to go. Specifically, the committer will compute n pairs of (extractable) blobs. Then it proves equality of each consecutive pair of blobs by running protocol ProveBlobsEquality with the receiver. The commitment phase is successful if all equality proofs are accepting. In the decommitment phase, the committer opens one blob for each pair. Namely, it reveals n blobs. Notice that, the committer cannot open any arbitrary set of blobs. The freedom of the committer is only in the choice of the index to open for each pair. The receiver accepts if two conditions are satisfied: 1) the committer opens one blob for each consecutive pair, 2) all revealed blobs open to the same bit. The construction is formally described in Fig. 1 . Proof Intuition. To prove UC-security we have to show a straight-line simulator Sim which correctly simulates the view of the real-world adversary A and extracts her input. Namely, when simulating the malicious committer in the ideal world, Sim internally runs the real-world adversarial committer A simulating the honest receiver to her, so to extract the bit committed to by A, and play it in the ideal world. This property is called extractability. When simulating the malicious receiver in the ideal world, Sim internally runs the real-world adversarial receiver A simulating the honest committer to her, without knowing the secret bit to commit to, but in such a way that it can be opened as any bit. This property is called equivocality. In the following, we briefly explain why both properties are achieved. In the proof we assume that parties communicate through authenticated channels. If all the pairs of blobs are not equal, i.e., all pairs are either (b, b) or (b,b), then A can later decommit to any bit. In this case the simulator fails in the extraction of the bit committed, and it aborts. Note that, this case happens only when all the pairs are not equal. Thus A was able to cheat in all executions of ProveBlobsEquality. Due to the soundness of ProveBlobsEquality, this event happens with probability 2 −n . Straight-line Equivocality. It follows straight-forwardly from the simulation property of ProveBlobsEquality. Sim in this case works as follows. It prepares n pairs of blobs such that each pair contains blob of 0 and blob of 1, in randomly chosen positions. Sim is able to cheat in all executions of ProveBlobsEquality, by running the straight-line simulator associated to this protocol. In the decommitment phase, after having received the bit to decommit to, for each pair, Sim reveals the blob corresponding to the right bit.
Note that, in both cases Sim crucially uses the extractor associated to IdealExtCom, that in turn uses the access to F aux . The formal proof of Theorem 1 can be found in App. C.
In Section 4 we show an implementation of IdealExtCom with malicious PUFs, while in Section 5, we show how to implement IdealExtCom using stateless token. By plugging such implementations in protocol UCComCompiler we obtain the first unconditional UC-secure commitment scheme with malicious PUFs (namely, in the F PUF -hybrid model), and stateless tokens (namely, in the F wraphybrid model).
Ideal Extractable Commitment from (Malicious) PUFs
In this section we show a construction of ideal extractable commitment in the F PUF model. Our construction builds upon the ideal commitment scheme in the F PUF model presented in [OSVW13] . We refer to this protocol as IdealCPuf. For simplicity, in the informal description of the protocol we omit mentioning the use of fuzzy extractors and the formalism for invoking the F PUF functionality. Such details are provided in the formal descriptions ( Fig. 8 and Fig. 2 ).
Ideal Commitment Scheme in the F PUF Model (from [OSVW13]). The idea behind the protocol of [OSVW13]
, that we denote by IdealCPuf = (C IdealPuf , R IdealPuf ), is to turn Naor's commitment scheme [Nao89] 2 which is statistically binding but only computationally hiding, into statistically hiding and binding, by replacing the PRG with a (possibly malicious) PUF. Roughly, protocol IdealCPuf goes as follows. At the beginning of the protocol, the committer creates a PUF, that we denote by P S . It preliminary queries P S with a random string s (of n bits) to obtain the response σ S (of rg(3n) bits, where rg is the PUF's range) and finally delivers the PUF P S to the receiver. After receiving the PUF, the receiver sends a random string r (i.e., the first round of Naor's commitment) to the committer. To commit to a bit b, the committer sends c =σ S ⊕ (r ∧ b |r| ) to the receiver. In the decommitment phase, the committer sends (b, s) to the receiver, who checks the commitment by querying P S with s. Hiding intuitively follows from the fact that a fuzzy extractor applied to the PUF-response σ S yields to a uniformly distributed value. Thus, commitment of 1 ,i.e., c =σ S ⊕ r and commitment of 0, i.e., c =σ S , are statistically close. Binding follows the same argument of Naor's scheme and is based on the expansion property of the PUF where the challenge is n bits and the response is rg(3n) bits (for more details on the proof the reader is referred to [OSVW12]). The formal description of IdealCPuf is provided in Fig. 8 in App. D.
Our Ideal Extractable Commitment Scheme in the F PUF Model. We transform IdealCPuf into a straight-line extractable commitmen that we call ExtPuf, using the following technique. We introduce a new PUF P R , sent by the receiver to the committer, at the beginning of the protocol. Then we force the committer to query the PUF P R with the opening of the commitment computed 2 Naor's scheme is a two-round commitment scheme. In the first round the receiver sends a random string r
3n to the committer. In the second round, the committer picks a random string s $ ← {0, 1} n , computes y ← G(s) and sends y ⊕ (r ∧ b) to the receiver, where G : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} 3n is a PRG and b is the bit to commit to. The opening consists of (y, b).
running IdealCPuf. An opening of protocol IdealCPuf is the value σ S 3 . In this way, the extractor, having access to the interface of F PUF , observes the queries made by the committer, and thus extracts the opening. Note that extractability must hold against a malicious committer, in which case the token P R sent by the receiver is honest, therefore the extractor is allowed to observe such queries. The idea is that, from the transcript of the commitment (i.e., the value c = σ S ⊕ (r ∧ b)) and the queries made to P R , (the value σ S ) the bit committed if fully determined 4 .
How can we force the committer to query P R with the correct opening? We require that it commits to the answer σ R obtained by P R , using again protocol IdealCPuf. Why the committer cannot send directly the answer σ R ? Because σ R could be the output of a malicious PUF, and leak information about the query made by the committer.
Thus, in the commitment phase, the committer runs two instances of IdealCPuf. One instance, that we call ComBit, is run to commit to the secret bit b. The other instance, that we call ComResp, is run to commit to the response of PUF P R , queried with the opening of ComBit. In the decommitment phase, the receiver gets P R back, along with the openings of both the bit and the PUF-response. Then it queries P R with the opening of ComBit, and checks if the response is consistent with the string committed in ComResp. Due to the unpredictability of PUFs, the committer cannot guess the output of P R on the string σ S without querying it. Due to the statistically binding of IdealCPuf, the committer cannot postpone querying the PUF in the decommitment phase. Thus, if the committer will provide a valid decommitment, the extractor would have observed the opening already in the commitment phase with all but negligible probability.
However, there is one caveat. The unpredictability of PUFs is guaranteed only for queries that are sufficiently apart from each other. Which means that, given a challenge/response pair (c, r), the response on any strings c that is "close" in hamming distance to c ("close" means that dis ham (c, c ) ≤ d min ), could be predictable. Consequently, a malicious committer could query the PUF with a string that is only "close" to the opening. Then, given the answer to such a query, she could predict the answer to the actual opening, without querying the PUF. In this case, the extractor cannot determine which is the opening, since it cannot try all possible strings that are "close" to queries made by the malicious committer. Thus the extraction fails. At the same time, the malicious committer did not violate the unpredictability property of PUFs, since it predicted a value that is "too close" to the one already observed.
We overcome this problem by using Error Correcting Codes, in short ECC (see Def. 6). The property of an ECC with distance parameter dis, is that any pair of strings having hamming distance dis, decodes to a unique string. Therefore, we modify the previous approach asking the committer to query P R with the encoding of the opening, i.e., Encode(σ S ). In this way, all queries that are "too close" in hamming distance, decode to the same opening, and the previous attack is defeated.
Informally, hiding and biding follow from properties of IdealCPuf. Indeed, protocol ExtPuf basically consists in running two instances of IdealCPuf in parallel. Extractability follows from the statistically biding of IdealCPuf, the unpredictability of P R and the Minimum Distance Property of ECC. The formal description of the protocol ExtPuf described above is shown in Fig. 2 . PUF parameters of Protocol ExtPuf for Bit Commitment. ExtPuf requires two PUFs P S , P R .
3 In the actual implementation we require the committer to query PR with stS where (stS, pS) ← FuzGen(σS). 4 As we shall discuss in the security proof, a malicious sender can always compute c * so that it admits two valid openings (i.e., compute y0, y1 such that r = y0⊕y1 and set c * = y0) , and query PR with both openings (thus confusing the extractor). However, due to the binding of IdealCPuf, A will not be able to provide an accepting decommitment for such c * . Thus extractability is not violated. (Straight-line Extractability in Faux model, is violated when the extractor outputs ⊥, while the adversary provides an accepting decommitment). Fig. 8 ) is run as sub-routine. P S is the sid used to denote the PUF created by the committer in IdealCPuf. P R is the sid of the PUF created by the receiver. Committer's Input: b ∈ {0, 1}.
Commitment Phase
1. Receiver R ExtPuf : create a PUF sending (init PUF , P R , normal, R ExtPuf ) to F PUF and then handover it to C ExtPuf sending (handover
be the value obtained by C ExtPuf , after applying the fuzzy extractor to the answer obtained from its own PUF P S when running protocol ComBit.
3. Receiver R ExtPuf : If both decommitments are successfully completed, then R ExtPuf gets the bit b along with the opening st S for ComBit and string st R ||p R for ComResp. Check validity of st R : send (eval PUF , P R , R ExtPuf , Encode(st S )) to F PUF and obtain σ R . Com- P S is sent by the committer to the receiver when executing IdealCPuf as sub-protocol. IdealCPuf is used to commit to a bit b and to a K-bit string where K = |(st R ||p R )|. P S has challenge size n and range size rg(K ) (with = 3n). P R is sent by the receiver and is used for extractability only. P R has challenge size L and range size rg 1 (L). Note that parameters of P R are independent of the number of bits that are committed. Replacement of the honest PUF. In the decommitment phase the committer sends back P R to the receiver. The receiver checks the validity of the decommitment by querying P R . A malicious committer could replace P R with another PUF, in which case the extractability property is not achieved anymore. This attack can be easily overcome by assuming that before giving its own PUF P R away, the receiver queries it with a secret random challenge and stores the response. Then when P R is sent back, the receiver checks its authenticity by querying P R on the same challenge and matching the response obtained with the one stored.
On round complexity of ExtPuf. For simplicity in Fig. 2 we describe the interaction between C ExtPuf and R ExtPuf using several rounds. However, we stress that the exchange of the PUF can be done once at the beginning of the protocol, and that except from the PUF transfer, the commitment phase requires only three rounds. The decommitment is non-interactive and requires another PUF transfer.
Theorem 2. If IdealCPuf is an Ideal Commitment in the F PUF -model, then Protocol ExtPuf is an Ideal Extractable Commitment in the F PUF model.
The proof of this theorem is provided in Appendix E.1.
Ideal Extractable Commitments from Stateless Tokens
In this section we show how to construct ideal extractable commitments from stateless tokens. We first construct an ideal commitment scheme. Then, we use it as building block for constructing an ideal extractable commitment.
Ideal Commitment Scheme in the F wrap Model. Similarly to the construction with PUFs, we implement Naor's commitment scheme by replacing the PRG with a stateless token. Note that Naor's commitment is already statistically binding, therefore the token is only used to obtain also statistically hiding. In the construction with PUFs, the PRG was replaced with a PUF that is inherently unpredictable. Indeed, by assumption, even after observing a polynomial number of challenge/response pairs, a malicious receiver cannot predict the output of the PUF on any new (sufficiently far apart) challenge. In this case, hiding breaks only if the receiver guesses the challenge used by the committer, which happens only with negligible probability. Hence, hiding holds unconditionally. Now, we want to achieve statistically hiding using stateless token. The problem here is that we do not have unpredictability for free (as it happens with PUFs). Thus, we have to program the stateless token with a function that is, somehow, unconditionally unpredictable. Clearly, we cannot construct a token that implements a PRG. Indeed, after observing a few pairs of input/output, an unbounded receiver can extract the seed, compute all possible outputs, and break hiding. We follow that same idea as [GIMS10] and we use a point function. A point function f is a function that outputs always zero, except in a particular point x, in which it outputs a value y. Formally, f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} m such that f (x) = y and f (x ) = 0, for all x = x.
Thus, we adapt Naor's commitment scheme as follows. The committer picks a n-bit string x and a 3n-bit string y and creates a stateless token that on input x outputs y, while it outputs 0 on any other input. The stateless token is sent to the receiver at the beginning of the protocol. After having obtained the token, the receiver sends then Naor's first message, i.e., the random value r, to the committer. The committer commits to the bit b by sending c = y ⊕ (r ∧ b |r| ). In the decommitment phase, the committer sends x, y, b. The receiver queries the token with x and obtains a string y . If y = y the receiver accepts iff c = y ⊕ (r ∧ b).
Statistically binding follows from the same arguments of Naor's scheme. The token is sent away before committer can see r. Thus, since x is only n bits, information theoretically the committer cannot instruct a malicious token to output y adaptively on x. Thus, for any malicious possibly stateful token, binding is preserved.
Statistically hiding holds due to the fact that x is secret. A malicious receiver can query the token with any polynomial number of values x . But, whp she will miss x, and thus she will obtain always 0. Such an answer does not help her to predict y. The only way to obtain y is to predict x. This happens with probability 2 −n .
The above protocol is denoted by IdealCTok and is formally described in Fig. 3 . We stress that, this is the first construction of unconditional commitment scheme that is secure even against malicious stateful tokens. The previous construction of unconditional commitment scheme of [GIMS10] is secure as long as the malicious token is stateless (i.e., it assumes that the adversary cannot create stateful tokens). Furthermore, our constructions requires only one stateless token, while construction of [GIMS10] requires a number of tokens that depends on the security parameter.
From Bit Commitment to String Commitment. To commit to a -bit string using one stateless token only is sufficient to embed pairs (x 1 , y 1 ),. . ., (x , y ) in the token T C and to require that for each i, x i ∈ {0, 1} n and y i ∈ {0, 1} 3 n . Then, execute protocol IdealCTok for each bit of the string in parallel. The receiver accepts the string iff all bit commitments are accepting.
2. Receiver R IdealCTok : send (run, sid, R IdealCTok , T C , x) and obtain y. If b = 0, check that c = y. Else, check that y = c ⊕ r. If the check passes, accept and output b, else reject. Ideal Extractable Commitment in the F wrap model To achieve extractability we extend the ideal commitment scheme IdealCTok with three simple steps. First, make the receiver send a token T R to the committer. Second, make the committer to commit to the secret bit (using IdealCTok) and query token T R with the opening of such commitment (namely, value y). Third, the committer commits to the answer received from T R . In the decommitment phase, the receiver has to cross check the validity of two commitments (commitment of the bits and commitment of the answer) and the consistency of the answer with its own token. Note that with tokens there is no need for the committer to send the token back to the receiver, since the function embedded in the token is well known to the creator. However, with stateless tokens, achieving extractability is more complicated. Indeed, which function should T R run, that will force the committer to query it with the correct opening? Let us discuss some wrong solution, to then converge to the correct one.
Let Mac be a unconditional one-time MAC (for definition see App. A). Consider the function that takes as input a string y (the opening of ComBit) and outputs Mac(k, y), for some secret key k. Such function does not guarantee extractability. A malicious committer, can query the token on two random strings y 1 , y 2 (the token is stateless) and extract the MAC key. Later, the adversary can secretly compute the MAC on the actual opening y, without using the token. Thus, she will be able to provide a valid decommitment, while the extractor fails. Note that, this case is ruled out when using PUFs. The reason is that, even after many queries, the adversary is not able to compute the answer of the PUF on a new string y by herself.
Consider the function that takes as input a commitment's transcript (r, c) (of protocol IdealCTok) and the opening y. It checks that y is a correct opening of c, and if so, it outputs Mac(k, y). This function is still not sufficient for obtaining extraction. A malicious committer can query the token with arbitrary pairs (commitment, decommitment) that do not correspond to the actual commitment c sent to the receiver. Thus we are in the previous case again.
The right function to embed in the stateless token is the following. The function, parameterized by two independent MAC keys k rec , k tok , takes as input a commitment's transcript (r, c), a MAC-tag σ rec (value σ rec is computed by the receiver, i.e., the creator of the token) and an opening y. The function checks that y is a valid opening of (r, c), and that σ rec is a valid MAC-tag computed on (r, c) (i.e., σ rec = Mac(k rec , r||c)). If both checks are successful, the function outputs the MAC-tag computed on the opening y (i.e., σ tok = Mac(k tok , y)). Due to the unforgeability of the MAC, and the statistically binding property of the commitment scheme IdealCTok, a malicious committer can successfully obtain the answer to exactly one query. Note that, a malicious committer, can perform the following attack. Once it receives the string r from the receiver, it picks strings y 0 and y 1 such that r = y 0 ⊕ y 1 and sends the commitment c = y 0 to the receiver, obtaining the MAC of c. With the commitment so computed and the tag, it can query token T R twice with each valid opening. In this case, the committer can extract the MAC key, and at the same time baffling the extractor that observes two valid openings. The observation here is that, due to the binding of IdealCTok, for a commitment c computed in such a way, the malicious committer will not be able, in the decommitment phase, to provide a valid opening. (The reason is that, whp, she cannot instruct its token to output neither y 0 or y 1 ). Thus, the extractor fails and outputs ⊥, but at the same time the decommitment will not be accepting. Thus extractability is not violated.
As final step, the committer commits to the answer σ tok , using the scheme IdealCTok.
(If the token of the receiver aborts, the committer sets σ tok to the zero string). In the decommitment phase, the receiver, first checks the validity of both commitments (commitment of the bit, commitment of the answer σ tok ). Then, given the opening of the bit, it checks that σ tok is a valid MAC computed under key k tok on such opening.
Binding follows from the binding of IdealCTok and the unforgeability of MAC. Hiding still follows from the hiding of IdealCTok. Indeed, the answer of T R sent by the malicious receiver, is not forwarded to the receiver, but is committed using the ideal commitment IdealCTok. Furthermore, if T R selective aborts, the committer does not halt, but it continues committing to the zero-string. The receiver will get the answer in clear, only in the decommitment phase, when the bit has been already revealed. The formal description of the above protocol, that we denote by ExtTok, is shown in Fig. 4 . Token's parameters for ExtTok for Bit Commitment. ExtTok requires two tokens. T C is sent by the committer to the receiver when executing IdealCTok as sub-protocol. IdealCTok is used to commit to a bit b and to a n-bit string (recall that |σ tok | = n). Thus, T C must be loaded with the n-point function is f : {0, 1} n → {0, 1} n(3n) , with points (x 1 , y 1 ), . . . , (x n , y n ).
Theorem 3. Protocol ExtTok is an ideal extractable commitment in the F wrap model. Protocol ExtTok (Gen, Mac, Vrfy) is a one-time unconditional MAC. Protocol IdealCTok = (C IdealCTok , R IdealCTok ) is run as sub-routine. Committer's Input: b ∈ {0, 1}. Commitmen Phase 1. Receiver R ExtTok : pick MAC-keys: k rec , k tok . Create token T R implementing the following functionality. On input a tuple (r||c, σ rec , y): if Vrfy(k rec , r||c, σ rec ) = 1 and (c = y OR c = y ⊕ r) then output σ tok = Mac(k tok , y) else output ⊥.
(Formally, R ExtTok sends (create, sid, R ExtTok , C ExtTok , T R ) to F wrap ). Send T R to the sender C ExtTok . Commitment of the Secret Bit: ComBit. 2. C ExtTok ⇔ R ExtTok : run C IdealCTok (com, b), R IdealCTok (com) so that C IdealCTok commits to bit b. Let (r, c) be the transcript of such commitment phase. Let y be the opening of c. 3. Receiver R ExtTok : compute σ rec ← Mac(k rec , r||c). Send σ rec to Committer C ExtTok . 4. Committer C ExtTok : query T R with q= (r||c, σ rec , y) (i.e., send (run, sid, C ExtTok , T R , q) to F wrap ) and obtain σ tok . If token T R aborts, set σ tok = 0 n . 
A More Definitions
For two random variables X and Y with supports in {0, 1} n , the statistical difference between X and Y , denoted by SD(X, Y ), is defined as,
A function is negligible in n (or just negligible) if for every polynomial p(·) there exists a value n 0 ∈ N such that for all n > n 0 it holds that (n) < 1/p(n).
Indistinguishability. Let W be a set of strings. An ensemble of random variables X = {X w } w∈W is a sequence of random variables indexed by elements of W.
Definition 5. Two ensembles of random variables X = {X w } w∈W and Y = {Y w } w∈W are statistically indistinguishable, i.e., {X w } w∈W S ≡ {Y w } w∈W if for any distinguisher D there exists a negligible function such that
Unconditional One-Time Message Authentication Code. A one-time message authentication code (MAC) is defined as a triple of PPT algorithms (Gen, Mac, Vrfy). The key-generation algorithm Gen takes as input the security parameter 1 n and outputs a key k with |k| ≥ n. The taggeneration algorithm Mac takes as input a key k and a message m and outputs a tag t ← Mac(k, m). The verification algorithm Vrfy takes as input a key k, a message m and a tag t and outputs 1 if t is a valid MAC of the message m, it outputs 0 otherwise. A MAC is unconditionally one-time unforgeable if, for all keys k ← Gen(1 n ), for any adversary A observing a pair (t, m) ← Mac(k, m), probability that A generates a new pair (t , m ), such that Vrfy(k, m , t ) = 1, is negligible. Unconditional one-time MAC can be implemented using a pairwise independent hash function.
Definition 6 (Error correcting code). An (N, L, dis)-Error Correcting Code (ECC), is a tuple of algorithms (Encode, Decode) where Encode : {0, 1} N → {0, 1} L and Decode : {0, 1} L → {0, 1} N satisfy the following properties:
-Efficiency: Encode, Decode are deterministic polynomial time algorithms; -Minimum Distance:
it holds that Decode(c ) = m.
In our constructions we need
(3n, L, L log L )-Error Correcting Code.
A.1 More Definitions for PUFs
We follow the definition of PUF provided in [BFSK11a].
Definition 7 (Physically Uncloneable Functions). Let rg denote the size of the range of a PUFfamily and d noise denote a bound of the PUF's noise. P = (Sample, Eval) is a family of (rg, d noise )-PUF if it satisfies the following properties.
Index Sampling. Let I n be an index set. On input the security parameter n, the sampling algorithm Sample outputs an index id ∈ I n following a not necessarily efficient procedure. Each id ∈ I n corresponds to a set of distributions D id . For each challenge s ∈ {0, 1} n , D id contains a distribution D id (s) on {0, 1} rg(n) . D id is not necessarily an efficiently samplable distribution. Evaluation. On input the tuple (1 n , id, s), where s ∈ {0, 1} n , the evaluation algorithm Eval outputs a response σ ∈ {0, 1} rg(n) according to distribution D id (s). It is not required that Eval is a PPT algorithm. Bounded Noise. For all indexes id ∈ I n , for all challenges s ∈ {0, 1} n , when running Eval(1 n , id, s) twice, the Hamming distance of any two responses σ 1 , σ 2 is smaller than d noise (n).
In the following we use PUF id (s) to denote D id . When not misleading, we omit id from PUF id , using only the notation PUF.
Definition 8 (Average min-entropy). The average min-entropy of the measurement PUF(s) conditioned on the measurements of challenges Q = (s 1 , . . . , s poly(n) ) is defined by:
where the probability is taken over the choice of id from the PUF-family and the choice of possible PUF responses on challenge s. The term PUF(Q) denotes a sequence of random variables PUF(s 1 ), . . . , PUF(s poly(n) ) each corresponding to an evaluation of the PUF on challenge s k .
Fuzzy Extractors. We now provide a formal definition of Fuzzy Extractors. Let U denote the uniform distribution on -bit strings. Let M be a metric space with the distance function dis:
Definition 9 (Fuzzy Extractors). Let dis be a distance function for metric space M. A (m, , t, )-fuzzy extractor is a pair of efficient randomized algorithms (FuzGen, FuzRep) . The algorithm FuzGen on input w ∈ M, outputs a pair (p, st), where st ∈ {0, 1} is a secret string and p ∈ {0, 1} * is a helper data string. The algorithm FuzRep, on input an element w ∈ M and a helper data string p ∈ {0, 1} * outputs a string st. A fuzzy extractor satisfies the following properties.
Correctness. For all w, w ∈ M, if dis(w, w ) ≤ t and (st, p)
Security. For any distribution W on the metric space M, that has min-entropy m, the first component of the random variable (st, p), defined by drawing w according to W and then applying FuzGen, is distributed almost uniformly, even given p, i.e., SD((st, p), (U , p)) ≤ .
Fuzzy Extractors Applied to PUF
, a matching fuzzy extractor has the following parameters: (n) = n, t(n) = d noise (n), and is a negligible function in n. The metric space M is the range {0, 1} rg with Hamming distance dis ham . We call such PUF family and fuzzy extractor as having matching parameters, and the following properties are guaranteed.
Well-Spread Domain. For all polynomial p(n) and all set of challenges s 1 , . . . , s p(n) , the probability that a randomly chosen challenge is within distance smaller than d min with any s k is negligible.
Extraction Independence. For all challenges s 1 , . . . , s p(n) , and for a challenge s such that dis(s, s k ) > d min for 1 ≤ k ≤ p(n), it holds that the PUF evaluation on s and subsequent application of FuzGen yields an almost uniform value st even if p is observed.
Response consistency. Let σ, σ be the responses of PUF when queried twice with the same challenge s, then for (st, p)
A.2 Ideal Functionalities and the UC framework
An ideal functionality F is specified as an interactive Turing machine that privately communicates with the parties and the adversary and computes a task in a trusted manner. The specification of the functionality also models the adversary's ability to obtain leaked information and/or to influence the computation, also in case the adversary corrupts parties. The world in which parties privately interact with the trusted machine F is called ideal world.
A real protocol Π is specified as an ITM executed by the parties. Parties communicate over the channel in presence of an adversary A which controls the schedule of the communication over the channel, and can corrupt parties. When a party is corrupted the adversary receives its secret input and its internal state. In this work, we consider only static adversaries, which means that A can corrupt a party only before the protocol execution starts. This is called real world.
A protocol Π securely realizes F if for any real world adversary A, there exists an ideal adversary Sim, such that the view generate by A running the actual protocol is indistinguishable from the view generated by Sim who has only access to the trusted party F.
We also consider a G-hybrid model, where the real-world parties are additionally given access to an ideal functionality G. During the execution of the protocol, the parties can send inputs to, and receive outputs from, the functionality G.
In the universally composable framework [Can01], the distinguisher of the views is the environment Z. Z has the power of choosing the inputs of all the parties and guide the actions of the adversary A (scheduling messages, corrupting parties), who will act just as proxy overall the execution. Let IDEAL F ,Sim,Z be the distribution ensemble that describes the environment's output in the ideal world process, and REAL G Π,A,Z the distribution of the environment's output in the real world process in the G-hybrid model.
Definition 10 (Information theoretically UC-security). Let F be an ideal functionality, and Π be a PPT protocol. We say Π realizes F in the G-hybrid model if for any hybrid-model static adversary A, there exists an ideal world expected PPT adversary Sim such that for every environment Z, for all auxiliary information to z ∈ {0, 1} * to Z, it holds:
We stress that, there exist different formulations of the UC framework, capturing different requirements on the set-assumptions (e.g., [CDPW07, BFSK11a] ). In some formulation for example, the set-up assumption is global, which means that the environment has direct access to the set-up functionality G and therefore the simulator Sim needs to have oracle access to G as well. In [BFSK11a] instead, while they assume that Sim cannot simulate (program) a PUF, and thus has always access to the ideal functionality F PUF , they require that Z has not permanent access to F PUF .
Commitment Ideal Functionality F com . The ideal functionality for Commitment Scheme as presented in [CF01], is depicted in Fig. 5 .
Functionality F com F com running with parties P 1 , . . . , P n and an adversary Sim proceeds as follows:
• Commitment Phase: Upon receiving a message (commit, sid, P i , P j , b) from P i where b ∈ {0, 1}, record the tuple (sid, P i , P j , b) and send the message (receipt, sid, P i , P j ) to P j and Sim. Ignore any subsequent commit messages.
• Decommit Phase: Upon receiving (open, sid, P i , P j ) from P i , if the tuple (sid, P i , P j , b) is recorded then send (open,sid, P i , P j , b) to P j and to Sim and halt. Otherwise ignore the message. 
A.3 F PUF Ideal Functionality for Malicious PUFs
A malicious PUF is any physical device that "looks like" a PUF but it does not satisfy the PUF's security property. Namely, a malicious PUF could implement any function chosen by the adversary, and it can be stateful. Fig. 6 . F PUF is parametrized by one honest PUF family and one malicious PUF family. In our construction we need two PUFs that have different parameters. This is not a problem, since F PUF can be straightforwardly extended so that it is parametrized by more then one honest PUF family. For more details about the model the reader is referred to [OSVW13].
A.4 F wrap Ideal Functionality modeling Stateless Tokens
The original work of Katz [Kat07] introduces the ideal functionality F wrap to model stateful tokens in the UC-framework. A stateful token is modeled as a Turing machine. In the ideal world, a party that wants to create a token, sends the Turing machine to F wrap . The adversary is, of course, allowed to send an arbitrarily malicious Turing machine to F wrap . This translates in the fact that the adversary can send a malicious token to the honest party. F wrap will then run the machine (keeping the state), when the designed party will ask for it. The same functionality can be adapted to model stateless tokens. It is sufficient that the functionality does not keep the state between two executions.
One technicality of the model proposed by [Kat07] is that it assumes that the adversary knows the code of the tokens that she sends. In real life, this translates to the fact that an adversary cannot forward tokens received from other parties, or tamper with its own token, so that the actual behavior of the token is not known to anyone. The advantage of this assumption, is that in the security proof the simulator can rewind the token.
In [CGS08], Chandran, Goyal and Sahai, modify the original model of Katz, so to allow the adversary to create tokens without knowing the code. Formally, this consists in changing the 'create' command of the F wrap functionality, which now takes as input an Oracle machine instead of a Turing machine. The model of [CGS08] is even stronger and allows the adversary to encapsulate tokens.
Our security proofs are unconditional, and our simulator and extractor only exploit the interface access to the ideal functionality F wrap (i.e., they only observe the queries made by the adversary), namely, they do not need adversary's knowledge of the code. Therefore, our proofs hold in both [CGS08] and [Kat07] models. In this work, similarly to all previous work on stateless tokens [Kol10, GIS + 10, CKS + 11], and also [GIMS10], we do not consider adversaries that can perform token encapsulation. To sum up, a malicious token is a physical device that "looks like" a token but implements a functionality which is arbitrarily different from the one dictated by the protocol. It is assumed that once a malicious token is sent away to the honest party, it cannot communicate with its creator.
A simplification of the F wrap functionality as shown in [CGS08] (that is very similar to the F wrap of [Kat07]) is depicted in Fig. 7 .
F PUF uses PUF families P 1 = (Sample normal , Eval normal ) with parameters (rg, d noise , d min , m), and P 2 = (Sample mal , Eval mal ). It runs on input the security parameter 1 n , with parties P = { P 1 , . . . , P n } and adversary S.
• When a partyP ∈ P ∪ { S } writes (init PUF , sid, mode,P ) on the input tape of F PUF , where mode ∈ { normal, mal }, then F PUF checks whether L already contains a tuple (sid, * , * , * , * ): − If this is the case, then turn into the waiting state. − Else, draw id ← Sample mode (1 n ) from the PUF family. Put (sid, id, mode,P , notrans) in L and write (initialized PUF , sid) on the communication tape ofP .
• When party P i ∈ P writes (eval PUF , sid, P i , s) on F PUF 's input tape, check if there exists a tuple (sid, id, mode,
• When a party P i sends (handover PUF , sid, P i , P j ) to F PUF , check if there exists a tuple (sid, * , * , P i , notrans) in L. − If not, then turn into waiting state. − Else, modify the tuple (sid, id, mode, P i , notrans) to the updated tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans(P j )). Write (invoke PUF , sid, P i , P j ) on S's communication input tape.
• When the adversary sends (eval PUF , sid, S, s) to F PUF , check if L contains a tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans( * )) or (sid, id, mode, S, notrans). − If not, then turn into waiting state. − Else, run σ S ← Eval mode (1 n , id, s) and return (response PUF , sid, s, σ S ) to S.
• When S sends (ready PUF , sid, S) to F PUF , check if L contains the tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans(P j )). − If not found, turn into the waiting state. − Else, change the tuple (sid, id, mode, ⊥, trans(P j )) to (sid, id, mode, P j , notrans) and write (handover PUF , sid, P i ) on P j 's communication input tape and store the tuple (received PUF , sid, P i ).
• When the adversary sends (received PUF , sid, P i ) to F PUF , check if the tuple (received PUF , sid, P i ) has been stored. If not, return to the waiting state. Else, write this tuple to the input tape of P i . Figure 6 : The ideal functionality F PUF for malicious PUFs.
B Properties of Protocol ProveBlobsEquality
For convenience protocol ProveBlobsEquality is rewritten below. Recall that a blob is a pair of commitments to bit, and the value committed to in a blob is the xor of such bits. Namely, a blob B i is the pair (c 0 i , c 1 i ), of commitments of bits (b 0 i , b 1 i ), and the values committed to in blob B i is the bit
For simplicity in the following we use b i , b j to denote "the bit committed in blob B i , B j ".
ProveBlobsEquality(B i , B j ) 1. V uniformly chooses e ∈ {0, 1} and commits to e using IdealExtCom.
Functionality F wrap F wrap is parameterized by a polynomial p(·) and an implicit security parameter n.
Create. Upon receiving (create, sid, P i , P j , T ) from P i , where P j is another party in the system and T is an oracle machine do:
1. Send (create, sid, P i , P j , T ) to P j . 2. Store (P i , P j , T ).
Execute. Upon receiving (run, sid, P i , T , msg) from P j , find the unique stored tuple (P i , P j , T ) (if no such tuple exists, then do nothing). Run T with input msg for at most p(n) steps and let out be the response (set out =⊥ if T does not respond in the allotted time). Send (sid, P i , out) to P j .
Figure 7: The F wrap functionality.
4. P reveals b e i and b e j . V accepts iff y = b e i ⊕ b e j .
Completeness. Follows from completeness of the commitment scheme IdealExtCom used to commit the challenge e and to compute blobs B i , B j .
Lemma 1 (Soundness of ProveBlobsEquality). If IdealExtCom is an ideal commitment, then for any malicious prover P * , there exists a negligible function , such that if
Proof. The prover can cheat in two ways: 1) by guessing the challenge. In this case P * can just compute y as b e i ⊕ b e j and convince the verifier; 2) by breaking the binding of IdealExtCom used to compute the blobs. Due to the statistically hiding property of IdealExtCom, probability that any P * guesses the challenge committed by V , is only negligibly better than 1/2. Due to the statistically binding property of IdealExtCom, probability that P * opens a commitment adaptively on the challenge is negligible.
Lemma 2 (Privacy of ProveBlobsEquality). Assume that B i , B j are statistically hiding commitments. If b i = b j then for any malicious verifier V * the view is independent on the actual value of b i and b j .
Proof. We prove that given a view of V * , any value for b i , b j is equally likely. The view of V * after the execution of protocol ProveBlobsEquality consists of: B i , B j ,y, b e i , b e j . We argue that any bit β ∈ {0, 1} is consistent with such view. Indeed, since bits b 0 i , b 1 i , b 0 j , b 1 j are randomly chosen, for any bit β there exists a pair bē i , bē j such that y = bē i ⊕ bē j and β = b e i ⊕ bē i and β = b e j ⊕ bē j .
Lemma 3 (Simulation of ProveBlobsEquality in the F aux model). If IdealExtCom is a straight-line extractable commitment in the F aux -hybrid model, then there exists a straight-line PPT algorithm SimFalse, called simulator, such that for any V * , the view of V * interacting with SimFalse on input a pair (B i , B j ) of possibly not equal blobs (i.e., b i = b j ) is statistically close to the view of V * when interacting with P and b i = b j .
Proof. In the following we use the assumption that blobs are statistically hiding, therefore given B i , B j , any pair b i , b j is equally likely to be the committed values. Let E be the straight-line extractor associated to IdealExtCom as required by Definition 3. On common input (B i , B j ), SimFalse has interface access to F aux and works as follows.
SimFalse (B i , B j )
1. (V * has to commit to the challenge e.) For the commitment phase of IdealExtCom, run extractor E as-subroutine forwarding all the messages computed by E to V * and viceversa, and having interface access to F aux (access to F aux is needed to run procedure E). After the completion of the commitment phase, obtain b ∈ {0, 1, ⊥} fromE. If V * or E aborts, then halt.
3. Upon receiving the decommitment e of the challenge:
-If e = b then abort. We call this event extraction abort.
Since E is straight-line (due to the straight-line extractability of IdealExtCom) and generates a transcript that is identical to the one generated by an honest receiver (due to the simulation property of IdealExtCom), the only deviation of SimFalse w.r.t. to an honest prover is in the computation of bit y. In the honest execution y is always b 0 i ⊕ b 0 j , in the simulated execution y depends on the challenge extracted, i.e., y = y b i ⊕ y b j . For simplicity, let us assume that the challenge extracted b corresponds to the one that is later revealed by V * , i.e.,b = e (we handle the case in which is not later).
We argue that, for any V * the view obtained interacting with an honest prover P and b i = b j (honest execution), is statistically close to the view obtained interacting with SimFalse and b i = b j (simulated execution).
The view of V * at the end of the execution of ProveBlobsEquality consists of: ((B i , B j ), y, b e i , b e j ). In case e = 0, it is easy to see that, given that blobs are statistically hiding, the view of the honest execution is statistically close to the view of the simulated execution. Indeed, in this case y is computed as b 0 i ⊕ b 0 j , exactly as in the honest execution. In case e = 1, in the simulated experiment y is computed as b 1 i ⊕ b 1 j , deviating from the honest procedure where
Here is sufficient to observe that, in the honest execution,
obtained in the simulation is still statistically close (given the hiding of blobs) to the distribution obtained from the honest execution.
When the challenge extracted (if any) is different from the one revealed by V * , SimFalse aborts. Thus probability of observing abort in the simulated execution is higher than in the honest execution. Nevertheless, due to the extractability property of IdealExtCom, probability of aborting because of extraction failure is negligible.
Here we prove another property of ProveBlobsEquality that will be useful when proving the straight-line equivocality of protocol UCComCompiler. The following lemma is required only for the case in which the simulator was used to prove a false theorem (i.e., b i = b j ). Indeed, when b i = b j the transcript of the simulation is always statistically close to the transcript of the honest execution even after one of the blob is revealed. We want to argue that, even after b i is known, still the view generated by the simulator is statistically close to the view of the honest execution. Consider the case in which e = 1 (the case in which e = 0 follows straight-forwardly). At the beginning all four bits b 0 i , b 1 i , b 0 j , b 1 j are hidden to V * . After the protocol execution V * knows bit b 1 i , b 1 j and y that is supposed to be xor of b 0 i , b 0 j . We already proved that in this case any value b i , b j of the blobs is equally likely. After blob B i and therefore bit b i is revealed, V * knows 3 out of 4 bits, and the value of b 0 j is determined by the knowledge of
In the honest executions the equation is certainly satisfied since b i = b j and y is honestly computed. We show that in the simulated experiment, the equation always holds (note that in this argument we are using the fact that all shares
are randomly chosen). Given the equation:
given that in the simulation y = b 1 i ⊕b 1 j , and b i = b 0 i ⊕b 1 i ; by replacing y and b i we have:
C UC-security of UCComCompiler
In this section we provide formal proof of Theorem 1. We show a straight-line simulator Sim having interface access to F aux and interacting with F com only, that for any environment Z, generates a transcript that is indistinguishable from the transcript that Z obtains from the real-world adversary A participating (or just observing) the real protocol execution. We distinguish three cases, according to which party Z corrupts, if any.
C.1 Committer and Receiver are honest
In this case the real-world adversary A is instructed by Z to not corrupt any party. The goal of the simulator is to generate the transcript of the interaction between honest parties C uc , R uc . The procedure of Sim is described in Simulator 1.
Simulator 1. [Sim in the honest-honest case.]
Commitment Phase. Whenever F com writes (receipt, sid, C uc , R uc ) to the communication tape of Sim in the ideal world, then this message indicates that Z wrote the secret bit b to the input tape of C uc . Sim simulates the transcript of the commitment phase between C uc and R uc as follows.
1. For (i = 1; i = i + 2; i ≤ 2n − 1):
When the simulated C uc or R uc queries functionality F aux , interact with F aux from their behalf.
2. For (i = 1; i = i + 2; i ≤ 2n − 1), simulate execution of ProveBlobsEquality(B i ,B i+1 ) as follows (the following steps correspond to procedure SimFalse except for the first step, in which the challenge is not extracted but randomly chosen by Sim):
-pick a random challenge e, and let C uc , R uc run commitment phase of IdealExtCom where R uc runs as a committer on input e, and C uc runs as a receiver. Note that, in Step 2, Sim is basically running algorithm SimFalse. The only difference with SimFalse is that the challenge e is not extracted using extractability of IdealExtCom, but it is chosen by Sim itself. Therefore, in the following proof we will use the lemmata proved in Section B.
Claim 1 (Indistinguishability of the simulation when both parties are honest). If blobs are ideal commitments, for any real-world adversary A and any environment Z, the transcript generated by Sim (Simulator 1) is statistically indistinguishable from the interaction between honest real-world C uc , R uc .
Proof. In this proof we use only the statistically hiding property of IdealExtCom commitment scheme used to implement the Blob procedure, and the interface access of Sim to F aux which is necessary to honestly execute protocol IdealExtCom.
In the honest-honest case, the environment Z sets the input of the honest sender C uc , observes the communication between C uc and R uc , and possibly delays/drops messages (we assume authenticated channel) of the protocol through the dummy adversary A. We show that the transcript simulated by Sim 1 is statistically close to the actual transcript obtained from the real interaction of honest C uc , R uc . The proof goes by hybrids arguments. It starts from the real world, hybrid H 0 , in which (C uc , R uc ) honestly run the protocol using the input received from Z, and it ends to the ideal world, hybrid H 4 , where Sim simulates both parties without knowing the actual input.
C.2 Receiver is corrupt
In this case the environment Z instructs the real-world adversary A to corrupt the receiver R uc . The simulator in this case, is very close to Simulator 1 shown for the honest-honest case. Therefore we will just point out the differences with the previous simulator, and how the same indistinguishability proof can be consequently adapted.
Concerning the simulator, the main difference with Simulator 1 is in Step 2. While in the honesthonest case the challenge is chosen by Sim 1 itself, in the malicious receiver case, the challenge must be extracted from the adversary. This simply means that Step 2 must be replaced with procedure SimFalse shown in Lemma 2. Furthermore, the simulator in this case is not simulating R uc , but is internally running A that plays as a receiver. Thus, it has to take care of A aborting the protocol at any point.
The proof that such simulation is indistinguishable from the real-world execution goes along the same lines of the proof provided for the honest-honest case. The main difference is in hybrid H 2 , that in case of malicious receiver, is only statistically close to hybrid H 1 . Indeed, when the receiver is malicious we have to consider the negligible probability of the failure of the extractor associated to the commitment scheme IdealExtCom.
C.3 Committer is corrupt
In this case, the environment Z instructs the adversary A to corrupt the sender C uc . The simulator Sim internally simulates a copy of the dummy adversary A as well as A's communication with Z. In addition, Sim simulates the honest receiver R uc to A. The goal of Sim is to extract the bit that A is committing to in the simulated execution, so that it can send it to the ideal functionality F com .
The procedure of Sim very roughly is the following. Sim extracts the bits committed in each blob by running the extractor of IdealExtCom and then executes protocols ProveBlobsEquality exactly as the honest receiver R uc . If all the executions of ProveBlobsEquality are accepting, then Sim looks at the extracted pair of bits, and proceeds as follow. In this case, Sim has no clue on which bit to play in the ideal functionality and fails. Since this case happens when the adversary was able to prove equality of n pairs that are not equal, probability that the adversary passes all these false proofs is 2 −n , which is negligible. Thus, probability that Sim fails in the extraction of the secret bit, is negligible as well. Sim is formally defined in Simulator 2.
Simulator 2 (Sim in case sender C uc is corrupt.). Activate A on input the security parameter n and the secret bit received by Z. When A starts the commitment phase, proceeds as follows.
Commitment Phase.
1. For j = 1, . . . , 2n: extract the bit committed in blob B j . Namely, run the procedure of the extractor E associated to IdealExtCom for the pair of commitments in B j . Obtain bits b 0
In this phase Sim uses the interface access to F aux as required by E. If E aborts in any of the executions, then Sim also aborts. If A does not abort in any of the commitments, proceeds to the next step.
2. If A proceeds to run ProveBlobsEquality(B i , B i+1 ), for all adjacent pairs, then follow the procedure of the honest receiver.
3. If all proofs are successful, consider the bits extracted in Step 1, and check which case applies:
1. There exists a bit b such all adjacent pairs of extracted bit are either (b, b) or (b,b). In this case, since in the decommitment phase A is required to open one bit for each pair, there is only one bit that A can possibly decommit to, and is the bit b. Thus, send (commit, sid, C uc , R uc , b) to F com . 2. There exists at least an adjacent pair of bits (b, b) and at least one pair of bits (b,b Proof. Sim 2 behaves almost identically to honest receiver R uc . Indeed, it runs E in the first step, that due to the simulation property of IdealExtCom, generates a view that is identical to the one generated by an honest receiver. Then it honestly follows protocol ProveBlobsEquality. However, differently from the honest receiver, Sim 2 aborts more often. Specifically, Sim 2 additionally aborts in the following two cases:
Case 1. In Step 1, when the extractor E fails in extracting the bit from any of the blobs.
Case 2. In Step 3, Sim fails in determining the bit committed to by A. We call this event Input extraction Failure, since Sim fails in extracting the input to send to the ideal functionality F com .
Case 3. In the decommitment phase A opens to a bit b that is different from the one extracted by Sim.
Due to the extractability property of the ideal extractable commitment IdealExtCom, Case 1 happens only with negligible probability. Due to Lemma 5, probability of Case 2 is also negligible. Finally, due to the statistically binding property of Blobs, probability that A can open to a bit that is different from the one extracted is negligible. Therefore, the view of A simulated by Sim is statistically close to the view obtained from the interaction with real world receiver. Which implies that the distribution of the input extracted by Sim is statistically close to the distribution of the input played in the real world, and the communication between A and Z simulated by Sim is also statistically close to the communication of Z with A interacting in the real protocol. Which implies that REAL Faux UCCom,A,Z and IDEAL F ,Sim 2,Z are statistically close.
Lemma 5. Probability of event Input extraction Failure is negligible.
Proof. Event Input extraction Failure happens when both the following events happen:
Event 1: all executions of protocol ProveBlobsEquality are successful. Namely, for all i 5 , ProveBlobsEquality( B i , B i+1 ) provided by A is accepting.
Event 2: Each consecutive pair of blobs is not equal. Namely, for all i, b i = b j , where b i and b j are the bits committed respectively in B i , B i+1 .
Due to the soundness of protocol ProveBlobsEquality, an adversary committing to n consecutive pairs that are all not equal, passes all the equality proof with probability 1 2 n , which is negligible.
D Ideal Commitment Scheme of [OSVW13]
In Fig. 8 is depicted the ideal extractable commitment scheme based on (malicious) PUFs and presented in [OSVW13] . P S denote the sid for accessing the PUF created by F PUF functionality.
From Bit Commitment to String Commitment. To commit to a k-bit string one executes protocol IdealCPuf k times in parallel and the receiver accepts the string iff all executions are accepting. The PUF family required for a k-bit string commitment is with challenge space n and range k3n (one can construct such PUF by combining several PUFs together and querying them with the same challenge and concatenating the responses). Indeed, the binding argument relies on the expansion factor between PUF-challenge and PUF-response. In case of k-composition the expansion factor must be k3n instead of 3n, since for each i ∈ [k], x i might convey n bits of information to a malicious stateful PUF. Hiding holds since probability that a malicious receiver guesses one of the challenges is k/2 n .
E Ideal Extractable Commitments: Proofs
In this section we provide formal proofs of our ideal extractable commitments shown in Section 4 and Section 5.
E.1 Proof of the Ideal Extractable Commitment with PUFs ExtPuf
In this section we formally prove that Protocol ExtPuf (shown in Fig. 2 ) is an ideal extractable commitment scheme. Namely, we provide the full proof of Theorem 2. b ∈ {0, 1}. Commitment Phase 1. Committer C IdealPuf : send (init PUF , normal, P S , C IdealPuf ) to F PUF and obtain response (initialized PUF , P S ). Select a random string s ∈ {0, 1} n , send (eval PUF , P S , C IdealPuf , s) to F PUF and obtain response (response PUF , P S , s, σ S ). Compute (st S , p S ) ← FuzGen(σ S ), and send p S to R IdealPuf and (handover PUF , P S , C IdealPuf , R IdealPuf ) to F PUF .
2. Receiver R IdealPuf : obtain p S from the committer and (handover PUF , P S , C IdealPuf ) from F PUF . Pick random string r ∈ {0, 1} and send it to the committer.
Decommitment Phase
If the check passes, accept and output b, else output reject. Hiding. The commitment phase of protocol ExtPuf basically consists in the parallel execution of two instances of IdealCPuf. In the first instance, that we call ComBit, C ExtPuf commits to its secret bit b, in the other instance, that we call ComResp, it commits to some value received from the (possibly malicious) PUF P * R 6 . Although P * R could compute the response adaptively on the query observed, thus revealing information about the opening (recall that the query corresponds to the opening of ComBit), such information cannot reach A since the response is committed using IdealCPuf. Furthermore in case P * R aborts, C ExtPuf continues the protocol, committing to the string 0, in fact, ruling out selective abort attacks.
Formally, the hiding proof goes by hybrids:
In this experiment the committer honestly commits to the bit 0. Namely, it runs
ComBit to commit to 0, then in queries the possibly malicious PUF P * R with the opening of ComBit. Finally it commits to the answer received from P * R running protocol ComResp (if P * R aborts, the committer commits to the zero string H 3 : In this experiment the committer queries the possibly malicious PUF P * R with the opening of ComBit and commits to the answer (if any) running ComResp. If P * R aborts, the committer commits to the zero string. Due to the hiding of IdealCPuf, H 2 and H 3 are statistically close. In this experiment the committer is honestly committing to the bit 1. This completes the proof.
Binding. Binding follows straight-forwardly from the binding property of IdealCPuf.
Extractability. We show a straight-line PPT extractor E that having interface access to F PUF satisfies the properties of Definition 3. The extractor is formally described in Fig. 9 . A denotes the malicious sender.
Extractor E E creates PUF P R sending (init PUF , normal, P R , R ExtPuf ) to F PUF . E handovers the PUF to A, sending (handover PUF , P R , R ExtPuf , A) to F PUF . Queries made by A to P R are intercepted by E, stored in the variable Q, and then forwarded to F PUF . The answers received by F PUF are then forwarded to A. Commitment Phase: E honestly follows the procedure of R ExtPuf . If the commitment phase is accepting, E proceeds to extraction phase. Else, it halts. Let (r, c) be the transcript of ComBit. Extraction Phase: -If there exists a query x ∈ Q such that c = Decode(x) then output 0.
-If there exists a query x ∈ Q such that c = Decode(x) ⊕ r then ouput 1.
-Case 1) If there exist queries x 0 , x 1 ∈ Q s.t. c = Decode(x 0 ) AND c = Decode(x 1 ) ⊕ r then output ⊥. -Case 2) If there exist no query in Q that decodes to a valid opening of c, output ⊥. Extractor E satisfies the following properties.
E runs in polynomial time. E follows the procedure of the honest receiver, which is polynomial. In the extraction phase E runs algorithm Decode for at most polynomially many queries. Due to the efficiency property of ECC this operation also requires polynomial time.
Simulation. The extractor E follows the procedure of the honest receiver R ExtPuf , and additionally it collects the queries made by A to P R . Therefore the view of A interacting with E is identical to the view of A interacting with R ExtPuf .
Extraction. We have to prove that, when E outputs ⊥, probability that A provides an accepting decommitment is negligible. First, recall that E outputs ⊥ in two cases. Case 1) there exists a pair of queries x 0 , x 1 that are both valid openings of c. Case 2) there exists no query decoding to a valid opening of c.
-Case 1. Note that, A can always compute x 0 , x 1 such that r = Decode(x 0 )⊕Decode(x 1 ) and compute c = Decode(x 0 ). We argue that, if A computes c in such a way, then probability that A can provide an accepting decommitment for c is negligible. This follows directly from the binding of IdealCPuf. -Case 2. Towards a contradiction, assume that A does not query the PUF with any valid opening, but in the decommitment phase, A still provides an accepting decommitment. An accepting decommitment in ExtPuf consists of the decommitments of ComBit and ComResp. Namely, the bit b, along with the value st S such that c = st S ⊕ (r ∧ b), and the string (st R ||p R ) (for simplicity we are omitting the remaining decommitment data). Since the decommitment is accepting it holds that st R is the answer of the honest PUF P R on the query Encode(st S )(more precisely st R = FuzRep(σ R , p R ) where σ R is the actual answer of P R on input Encode(st S )). By hypothesis no queries received by P R in the commitment phase decoded to st S . Thus one of these two cases has happened: 1. A has correctly computed P R 's responds σ R without querying P R . In this case A breaks unpredictability of the honest PUF P R . Indeed, due to the Minimum Distance property of ECC, we have that all the valid codewords are at d min hamming distance from each other. Thus, the only way for A to obtain a response for an encoding of st S that was not inferred by E, is that such encoding is d min apart from any challenge observed by E.
Predicting the PUF-response of a challenge that is so far from the previously queried challenges, corresponds to break the unpredictability of the PUF. 2. A queries P R only in the decommitment phase. Then she opens the commitment of the response, ComResp, accordingly. Due to the statistically binding property of IdealCPuf, this case happens with negligible probability.
Binding. Here we have to prove that if E extracts bit b, probability that A decommits to bitb is negligible. This basically follows from the biding of the sub-protocol IdealCPuf.
E.2 Proof of the Ideal Extractable Commitments with Stateless Tokens ExtTok
In this section we provide a formal proof of Theorem 3. First, we prove that IdealCTok is an ideal commitment scheme in the F wrap model. Hiding. Hiding breaks if a malicious receiver A is able to compute y, in the commitment phase.
Recall that values x, y embedded into the stateless token T C are chosen uniformly at random. Furthermore, T C responds only on input x. Since A can make only polynomial number of queries to T C , it can get y only if she guesses x. This happens with negligible probability only.
Binding. The proof of binding can be adapted from the proof of protocol IdealCom (due to [OSVW13]). It is sufficient to observe that a malicious PUF can be a malicious token.
We are now ready to prove Theorem 3.
Proof. Completeness. Due to the completeness of the one-time unconditional MAC and the completeness of the sub-protocol IdealCTok.
Hiding. Follows directly from the hiding property of protocol IdealCTok. The formal argument is similar to the one provided in the hiding proof of Section E.1, and is therefore omitted. Binding. Follows directly from the binding property of protocol IdealCTok. Extractability. Extractability roughly follows from the binding of IdealCTok and the unconditional one-time unforgeability of MAC. Details follow.
We show a straight-line PPT extractor E that having interface access to F wrap satisfies the properties of Definition 3. The extractor is formally described in Fig. 10 . A denotes the malicious sender.
Extractor E E simulates the creation of T R . Queries made by A to T R are intercepted by E, stored in the variable Q, and then answered faithfully (i.e., by following the code of an honest T R ). Commitment Phase: E honestly follows the procedure of R ExtTok . If the commitment phase is accepting, E proceeds to the extraction phase. Else, it halts. Let (r, c) be the transcript of ComBit. Extraction Phase:
-If there exists a query q= (r||c, σ rec , y) ∈ Q such that Vrfy(k rec , r||c, σ rec ) = 1 and (c = y ) then output 0. -If there exists a query q= (r||c, σ rec , y) ∈ Q such that Vrfy(k rec , r||c, σ rec ) = 1 and (c = y ⊕ r ) then output 1. -Case 1) If there exist queries q 0 , q 1 ∈ Q s.t. q 0 = (r||c, σ rec , y 0 ) and q 1 = (r||c, σ rec , y 1 ), and Vrfy(k rec , r||c, σ rec ) = 1 and both y 0 , y 1 are valid openings for (r||c) then output ⊥. E runs in polynomial time. E follows the procedure of the honest receiver, which is efficient.
Simulation. The extractor E follows the procedure of the honest receiver R ExtTok , and additionally it collects the queries made by A to T R . Therefore the view of A interacting with E is identical to the view of A interacting with R ExtTok .
Extraction. We show that, probability that the extractor E outputs ⊥ (i.e., it fails in extracting the bit) but the adversary A is instead able to provide an accepting decommitment is negligible. From Fig. 10 E fails in the extraction in two cases.
In case 1, the adversary queries the token with two valid openings for the same commitment c. In this case, the commitment c is not binding. We argue that, due to the binding property of protocol IdealCTok, probability that A later provides an accepting decommitment for c is negligible. The reason is that, an opening of c is the pair x, y such that y = T C (x). Note also that |x| = n while |y| = 3n. The commitment c is equivocal only if c = y 0 and r = y 0 ⊕ y 1 for some pair y 0 , y 1 ∈ {0, 1} 3n . Since T C is sent to the receiver before the string r has been observed, probability that T C has been programmed with a pair of strings which exclusive-or is r is negligible. Since x is only n bits, the committer cannot later instruct the token T C to answer the value y b . Thus, probability that A computes a commitment c which is equivocal and can be accepted in the decommitment, is negligible as well. Hence, in case 1) extractability is not violated since the extractor fails only when the decommitment will be accepted whp. Now, consider case 2. Let r||c be the transcript of the commitment of ComBit. In case 2, the adversary A did not query the token T R with the opening of the commitment c (but she might have queried with other values). We argue that, in this case, probability that A provides an accepting decommitment is negligible. Assume, towards a contradiction, that A provides an accepting decommitment in protocol ExtTok. This means that A committed to a valid MAC, computed with the key k tok , of the opening y of commitment c, without querying T R with y. Now, A can compute such a MAC in two ways. Either, A was able to extract the key k tok by exploiting its access to the stateless T R , or A was able to forge the MAC under key k tok .
Due to the unconditional one-time unforgeability of MAC and the statistically binding of IdealCTok, A cannot query the token T R more then one time (thus extracting the key). Namely, it cannot query T R on values which prefix is different from r||c, σ rec where σ rec is received from the receiver (extractor). This is due to the one-time unforgeability of the MAC used to compute σ rec , and from the fact that A observes only one MAC computed with k rec . Once the prefix r||c is fixed, due to the binding of IdealCTok, probability that A can query the token for more then one opening is negligible (except the case in which c is properly crafted, that we analyzed before). Thus, probability that A obtains two MACs and extracts the key k tok , is negligible.
Since A cannot extract k tok , the only case in which it can generate a valid new mac for an opening y, without querying the token, is by forging the MAC. Due to the unforgeability of MAC, this happens with negligible probability.
